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BECKER, Circuit Judge. 
 This case arises under the Individuals with 
Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(2). 
Pursuant to IDEA, a school district is required to provide a 
disabled child with a "free appropriate education."  20 U.S.C. 
§1400(c).  J.C., a severely mentally retarded sixteen-year-old 
male, has attended the Ocean County Day Training Center ("OCDTC") 
since 1987.  In 1992, concerned about the appropriateness of 
their son's instruction, J.C.'s father and stepmother, M.C. and 
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G.C. ("plaintiffs"), began proceedings to secure both a 
residential placement for J.C. and compensatory education beyond 
his twenty-first year to make up for what they believed to be 
long-standing deficiencies in his program.  In 1995, the district 
court ordered that J.C. be relocated to a residential school, but 
refused to award compensatory education because it found that the 
defendant, Central Regional School District ("Central Regional," 
"school district," or "district"), had, in good faith, provided 
J.C. with some educational program.  Central Regional now appeals 
the residential placement, and plaintiffs cross-appeal the 
determination regarding compensatory education. 
 Rejecting Central Regional's challenge, we hold that 
the district court used the proper legal standard when it granted 
residential placement, and that its factual findings regarding 
that claim are supported in the record.  We will therefore affirm 
the award.  The cross-appeal requires us to revisit an issue 
reserved in our recent decision, Carlisle Area School v. Scott 
P., 62 F.3d 520, 537 (3d Cir. 1995), and to decide the proper 
standard for an award of compensatory education.  A school 
district that knows or should know that a child has an 
inappropriate Individualized Education Program (IEP) or is not 
receiving more than a de minimis educational benefit must, of 
course, correct the situation.  We hold that, if it fails to do 
so, a disabled child is entitled to compensatory education for a 
period equal to the period of deprivation, excluding only the 
time reasonably required for the school district to rectify the 
problem.  Because the district court applied an incorrect "good 
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faith" standard, we will reverse on the cross-appeal and remand 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
I.  Factual Background/ Procedural History 
 A. Factual Background 
 J.C.'s IEP stresses personal and self-help goals such 
as toileting and eating as well as more general communication, 
domestic, recreation, vocation, and community training skills. 
His preschool records reflect that he progressed well during his 
initial years of education.  Following J.C.'s placement at OCDTC 
in 1987, his development slowed.  Since 1989, J.C. has made 
little consistent improvement and in some aspects has even 
regressed. 
 For example, in 1988 and 1989, J.C.'s teachers, Juanita 
Jones and Susan Trainor, reported that J.C. could remove his 
shirt independently.  In 1990, Trainor indicated that J.C. could 
remove his shirt only after it was started for him.  By 1992, 
J.C.'s school records did not reflect any independent disrobing 
efforts.  Trainor related only that J.C. was "cooperative" and 
would "extend [his] arm/leg for dressing."   
 Likewise, pulling his pants up and down in preparation 
for toileting has been a self-help goal in J.C.'s IEP since 1989. 
By February 1991, J.C. was reportedly pulling his pants down with 
"moderate" physical assistance on two out of five days.  In May 
1991, J.C. continued to lower his pants with "moderate" 
assistance.  In May 1992, J.C. had regressed to where he was able 
to pull his pants down on two out of five days only with 
"maximum" physical assistance.  Similar reversion occurred in 
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J.C.'s ability to spear food, to drink from a cup, to 
communicate, and to pay attention. 
 Not only did J.C. perform poorly on stated IEP goals, 
but his IEP also failed to include several important objectives. 
For example, Central Regional's records indicate that J.C.'s 
self-stimulatory behavior, like chewing his shirt, was a serious 
problem impairing his educational progress.  Despite this fact, 
J.C.'s IEP contained no strategies to reduce the incidence of 
this behavior.      
 Another gap in J.C.'s IEP was parent training. 
According to Trainor, in order for J.C. to make steady progress, 
his program needed to be consistently implemented both inside and 
outside of the classroom throughout all his waking hours. 
Nevertheless, the IEP did not include parent training.  Minutes 
of the March 15, 1990, IEP meeting indicate that the plaintiffs 
requested someone from the school to come to their home to help 
with toileting and independent feeding.  They were never told 
that parent training was a related service that could be provided 
under J.C.'s IEP. 
 B. Procedural History 
  1.  The Administrative Hearing 
 Concerned that J.C. was not receiving a free 
appropriate education as guaranteed under IDEA, M.C. and G.C. 
wrote to Central Regional to request that J.C.'s 1992-93 IEP be 
revised and that he be placed in a residential school.  When 
Central Regional refused to change the IEP, M.C. filed a Petition 
for Hearing with the New Jersey Department of Education.   
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 Following a hearing, an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) 
found that OCDTC had provided an "appropriate education" for J.C. 
To give form to the "appropriate education" standard, the ALJ 
applied the Supreme Court's holding in Board of Education v. 
Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 200 (1982), that a school district must 
provide instruction "sufficient to confer some educational 
benefit upon the handicapped child."  According to the ALJ, a 
child with J.C.'s disabilities was not capable of more than very 
"limited and varied progress."  As such, the ALJ concluded that 
J.C.'s slight improvement "at times" in his ability to prepare 
himself to toilet, eat with a spoon, and drink from a cup 
satisfied Rowley's requirement that his schooling provide him 
"some educational benefit."  In his view, any residential 
placement went far beyond J.C.'s educational needs.   
  2.  The District Court Hearing   
 M.C. and G.C. appealed the ALJ's decision to federal 
district court.  The court agreed with the ALJ's conclusions that 
J.C.'s achievements appeared to be de minimis as well as 
inconsistent and scattered, and that in some areas J.C. had even 
regressed.  However, the court could not determine, based on the 
evidence presented at the administrative hearing, whether J.C.'s 
inadequate progress was a reflection of his (lack of) potential 
or of the inappropriateness of his placement at OCDTC. 
Accordingly, it convened a hearing to receive supplemental 
evidence.  
 In the wake of this hearing, the district court 
reversed the decision of the ALJ and ordered residential 
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placement.  The district court concluded that the ALJ had applied 
the wrong legal standard in reaching his determination.  The ALJ 
had relied on the Rowley formulation that a disabled child need 
only receive "some educational benefit" from his instruction. 
However, according to the district court, the ALJ failed to 
consider our cases interpreting that decision.  See Polk v. Cent. 
Susquehana Intermediate Unit 16, 853 F.2d 171 (3d Cir. 1988), 
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1030 (1989);  Bd. of Educ. v. Diamond, 808 
F.2d 987 (3d Cir. 1986).  Both Polk and Diamond make clear that 
an appropriate IEP must result in more than de minimis benefits 
to satisfy Rowley's "some educational benefit" standard.  As we 
wrote in Diamond, a plan for a severely handicapped student will 
satisfy the IDEA only if it is "likely to produce progress, not 
regression or trivial educational advancement."  Id. at 991.  
According to the district court, the "limited and varied" 
progress that the ALJ found was de minimis and therefore not 
sufficient to satisfy IDEA.        
 In determining that residential placement was 
appropriate for J.C., the court credited the testimony of the 
plaintiff's expert, Dr. Dana Henning.2  According to Dr. Henning, 
J.C.'s IEP did not sufficiently address his needs.  She testified 
that J.C. was capable of more than the de minimis results he had 
realized at OCDTC, but that he needed the intensive, round-the-
                                                           
2Dr. Henning has eighteen years of experience in teaching, 
assessing, evaluating and making educational recommendations for 
persons with severe or profound handicaps and challenging 
behaviors.  She estimated that she had evaluated close to a 
thousand severely and profoundly retarded children, one-third of 
whom had self-stimulatory behavior problems.   
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clock instruction of a residential school to receive meaningful 
benefit from his education.  Central Regional now appeals the 
residential placement order.  We review the district court's 
legal standard de novo and its factual findings for clear error.  
The district court denied the plaintiffs' request for 
compensatory education, and plaintiffs now appeal that 
determination.  At issue is the legal standard used by the court, 
over which we exercise de novo review.         
II.  The Residential Placement 
 Central Regional launches a three-pronged attack upon 
the district court's order of residential placement.  First, it 
argues that the district court misapplied Rowley, the principal 
authority establishing the standard of education services 
required under IDEA.  We conclude that the district court did not 
misconstrue the Rowley rule.  As this Court explained at length 
in Polk and Diamond, Rowley does not mean that IDEA is satisfied 
by affording the student a de minimis benefit.  The record 
supports the district court's conclusion that if J.C. received 
any value from the education afforded by the defendant, it was 
trivial and that is not sufficient.3    
 Second, Central Regional contends that the district 
court erred in finding that J.C. had "untapped potential," and in 
basing its order for residential placement upon that 
determination.  We hold that the court's conclusion that J.C had 
                                                           
3We therefore do not need to address J.C.'s argument that, even 
if the Rowley standard were satisfied, New Jersey obligates 
Central Regional to meet a higher standard.  See Geis v. Bd. of 
Educ., 774 F.2d 575, 583 (3d Cir. 1985). 
9 
untapped potential was not clearly erroneous.  As we have 
explained in Kruelle v. New Castle County School District, 642 
F.2d 687, 693 (3d Cir. 1981), special education for a low-
functioning child stresses (at least initially) basic life skills 
such as dressing, eating, and communicating.  The record reflects 
that J.C. had much potential in these areas.  For instance, Dr. 
Henning testified that J.C., on his own, would attempt to 
communicate his wants and needs to others by leading them where 
he wanted to go, an action which she concluded showed motivation 
and promise.   
 The court's decision to use its finding of untapped 
potential as a basis for residential placement was also not in 
error.  Dr. Henning, upon whom the court appropriately relied, 
attributed J.C.'s minimal progress at OCDTC to an inadequate 
program which, among other deficiencies, failed to address his 
self-stimulatory behaviors, and to an inappropriate placement, 
which did not allow him to practice his skills beyond the school 
day.  She testified that J.C. would develop more fully in a 
residential school.  The court was entitled to rely on her well-
supported conclusions.   
 Third, Central Regional asserts that the district court 
incorrectly concluded that the least restrictive educationally 
appropriate setting for J.C. was a full-time residential 
facility.  In essence, the school district argues that the order 
for residential placement conflicts with the statutory preference 
for inclusion.  Cf. Oberti v. Bd. of Educ., 995 F.2d 1204, 1220 
(3d Cir. 1993).  On the record in this case, we are satisfied 
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that a residential program is required for J.C. to make 
meaningful educational progress and that it meets the 
requirements of IDEA.   
 As we have detailed above, in view of the deficiencies 
in J.C.'s past program, he could no longer make adequate progress 
in a day setting.  The evidence supports the district court's 
conclusion that any attempts to reduce J.C.'s severe self-
stimulatory behavior or improve his toileting, eating, and 
communication skills would succeed only in the intense atmosphere 
of a round-the-clock residential setting where a consistent 
educational program could be enforced throughout all of J.C.'s 
waking hours.  A residential setting would also allow J.C. to 
learn skills in their natural atmosphere.  According to Dr. 
Henning, effective instruction for J.C. (as well as many other 
severely disabled children) requires that skills be presented in 
their usual environment and at the natural time of day.  For 
instance, J.C. could be better taught to cook in the residence's 
kitchen than in the artificial setting of a daytime classroom 
because he had trouble "generalizing" or transferring the skills 
learned in one environment to another.  The trial record, thus 
supports the conclusion that a residential setting is the least 
restrictive placement for J.C. at this time.  Our case law also 
supports this result.  See, e.g., Diamond, 808 F.2d at 992 (3d 
Cir. 1986) (residential placement is "least restrictive" 
environment for severely disabled child); Kruelle, 642 F.2d at 
693-95 (3d Cir. 1981) (residential placement is only "appropriate 
education" for seriously disabled child).   
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 Decisions from other circuits also bolster our refusal 
to disturb the district court's determination that placement in a 
residential center is appropriate here, where a less structured 
environment cannot do the job.  See Drew P. v. Clarke County Sch. 
Dist., 877 F.2d 927, 930 (11th Cir. 1989) (residential placement 
necessary for child with mental retardation and infantile autism 
to "make meaningful educational progress"), cert. denied, 494 
U.S. 1046 (1990); Abrahamson v. Hershman, 701 F.2d 223 (1st Cir. 
1983) (residential placement authorized if essential for student 
to make educational progress); see also 20 U.S.C. § 1401(16); 34 
C.F.R. §§ 300.302, 300.551.   
 The district court's order, insofar as it requires 
residential placement, will therefore be affirmed.  We will not 
direct modification of the order in response to plaintiffs' 
further contention that the district court erred in not directing 
Central Regional to place J.C. in a specific residential school. 
We find no abuse of discretion in that regard, though the 
district court is free to reconsider the matter of placement on 
remand.  We note, in conclusion, that the residential placement 
may only be temporary.  Once J.C. accumulates the life skills 
that he did not acquire while at OCDTC, he may well be able to 
return to a day placement.  This will appear from the required 
yearly IEP evaluation.   
III.  Compensatory Education 
 A.  Definition/ Historical Background 
 We now turn to the more difficult aspect of this case -
- the cross-appeal of J.C. from the district court's order 
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denying compensatory education.  Under IDEA, a disabled student 
is entitled to free, appropriate education until he or she 
reaches age twenty-one.  20 U.S.C. § 1412(2)(b).  A court award 
of compensatory education requires a school district to provide 
education past a child's twenty-first birthday to make up for any 
earlier deprivation.4   
 Federal courts began awarding compensatory education 
after the Supreme Court determined in School Committee of 
Burlington v. Department of Education, 471 U.S. 359, 370-71 
(1985), that tuition reimbursement was appropriate under the 
Education of the Handicapped Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461 (1982) 
(IDEA's predecessor).  In a typical reimbursement scenario, a 
parent who believed that a child was not receiving an appropriate 
public education would place the child in private education at 
his or her own expense.  Under Burlington, if a court later 
determined that the private placement was the appropriate one, 
the school district would have to reimburse the parent.   
 Tuition reimbursement was the Court's vehicle for 
satisfying both IDEA's pronouncement that children are entitled 
                                                           
4At least one federal court, see Johnson v. Bismarck Pub. Sch. 
Dist., 949 F.2d 1000, 1002 (8th Cir 1991), and numerous 
administrative law judges have upheld or awarded compensatory 
education during the summer months rather than after age twenty-
one.  See Perry A. Zirkel, Compensatory Education -- Questions 
and Answers, 10 The Special Educator 1, 147 (Dec. 10, 1994). 
 Parenthetically, the term compensatory education may 
also be used in a different sense to refer to special programs 
and services provided to "at-risk" students who are not 
succeeding in school but do not qualify for special education. 
Such programs include alternative schools, pregnancy and 
parenting programs, and group counseling programs.  See, e.g., 
Catherine P. Clark, Compensatory Education in Texas (1993).    
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to a free appropriate education and the congressional intent to 
provide relief for the deprivation of this right.  See Lester H. 
v. Gilhool, 916 F.2d 865, 872 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 
U.S. 923 (1991).  Extending the Burlington decision, the Eighth 
Circuit in Miener v. Missouri, 800 F.2d 749, 754 (8th Cir. 1986), 
cert. denied, 459 U.S. 909 (1982), awarded compensatory 
education.  The court reasoned that, like retroactive tuition 
reimbursement, compensatory education required school districts 
to "'belatedly pay expenses that [they] should have paid all 
along.'"  Id. at 753 (quoting Burlington, 471 U.S. at 370-71). 
The court "was confident that Congress did not intend the child's 
entitlement to free education to turn upon her parent's ability 
to 'front' its costs."  Id.  In Lester H., we adopted the 
position of the Miener court and approved a compensatory remedy. 
916 F.2d at 873.5   
 B. Formulating a Standard  
 In the case at bar, the court devoted only one 
paragraph of its opinion to compensatory education and disposed 
of the issue in the following manner: 
   With respect to plaintiffs' 
request for compensatory education, 
the Court concludes that such 
relief is inappropriate under the 
facts of this case.  Plaintiffs 
rely on Lester H. by Octavia P. v. 
Gilhool, 916 F.2d 865 (3d Cir. 
1990), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 923 
(1991), in which the school 
district knew before the child 
entered the school system that the 
                                                           
5In the process, we made clear that compensatory education could 
be awarded to plaintiffs who had already reached age twenty-one.  
Lester H. v. Gilhool, 916 F.2d 865, 872 (3d Cir. 1990).   
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district would be unable to provide 
an appropriate education.  Id. at 
873.  The decision to permit 
compensatory education was premised 
on the district's failure to fulfil 
what it knew or should have known 
were its obligations.  Id.  The 
facts of the present case are 
easily distinguishable.  Defendant 
provided J.C. with an education 
which it believed in good faith was 
appropriate.  A difference of 
opinion as to the adequacy of an 
educational program is not 
equivalent to a complete and total 
failure to provide a child with an 
education.  Therefore, this Court 
will not grant plaintiffs' motion 
with respect to this issue. 
 
Thus, the district court applied a "good faith" standard in 
determining whether to award compensatory education.  We review 
this approach de novo. 
 In order to define the correct standard for granting 
compensatory education, we must delineate the threshold of 
deficiency in the school board's stewardship necessary to trigger 
an award.  Unfortunately, there is little caselaw or legal 
commentary to guide us.  Likewise there are no New Jersey or 
federal regulations to direct our inquiry.  While this is not the 
first time we have contemplated this issue, the facts of our 
previous cases have made our past analyses relatively 
straightforward.    
 In Lester H., 916 F.2d at 873, we upheld an award of 
two-and-one-half years of compensatory education due to the 
school district's outrageous behavior.  In the fall of 1984, the 
district admitted that the twelve-year-old plaintiff was not 
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receiving an appropriate education.  Despite the existence of at 
least six suitable schools, the district did not locate an 
appropriate placement until January of 1987.  Id. at 873.  We 
wrote:  
[W]e hold that the district court did not 
abuse its discretion when it fashioned this 
remedy for Lester.  The court's award merely 
compensates Lester for what everyone agrees 
was an inappropriate placement from 1984 
through January, 1987 and belatedly allows 
him to receive the remainder of his free and 
appropriate public education.  
 
Id.       
 In Carlisle Area School v. Scott P., 62 F.3d 520 (3d 
Cir. 1995), we reviewed a district court's decision to grant six 
months compensatory education.  We reversed the award because the 
record contained no evidence indicating that the relevant IEP was 
inappropriate.  We concluded that, while we did not need to 
define the precise standard for awarding compensatory education, 
we could at least determine that it was necessary -- though not 
sufficient -- to show that some IEP was actually inappropriate. 
Id. at 537.  We noted that most cases awarding compensatory 
education had involved quite culpable conduct6 but determined 
                                                           
6See, e.g., Burr v. Ambach, 863 F.2d 1071, 1073 (2d Cir. 1988) 
(awarding compensatory education where state institution 
disqualified a student because of its purported inability to 
accommodate his multiple handicaps without mentioning or 
considering placement in an extant special program for multiple 
handicapped students); Jefferson County Bd. of Educ. v. Breen, 
853 F.2d 853, 857-58 (11th Cir. 1988) (awarding compensatory 
education to deter states from unnecessarily prolonging 
litigation); Miener v. Missouri, 800 F.2d 749, 754 (8th Cir. 
1986) (reversing denial of compensatory education for a child who 
spent three years in mental health ward of a state hospital after 
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that a grant of compensatory education did not require bad faith 
on the part of the school district.  Id.  We left our analysis 
there, but must now flesh out the standard left sparse by 
Carlisle.      
 The Second Circuit has conditioned an award of 
compensatory education on the presence of a "gross" deprivation 
of the right to free and appropriate education.  See Garro v. 
Connecticut, 23 F.3d 734, 737 (2d Cir. 1994) (requiring "gross 
procedural violation"); Mrs. C. v. Wheaton, 916 F.2d 69, 75 (2d 
Cir. 1990) (requiring "gross violation," defined as coercion of 
disabled child into terminating his right to further education). 
We reject this formulation because, in addition to being 
imprecise, it is not anchored in the structure or text of IDEA.  
 If the compensatory education standard is to spring 
from the Act, it must focus from the outset upon the IEP -- the 
road map for a disabled child's education.  See 20 U.S.C. 
§1414(a)(5).  When an IEP fails to confer some (i.e., more than 
de minimis) educational benefit to a student, that student has 
been deprived of the appropriate education guaranteed by IDEA.  
It seems clear, therefore, that the right to compensatory 
education should accrue from the point that the school district 
knows or should know of the IEP's failure.7 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
district failed to provide any educational services 
notwithstanding its own evaluation recommending such services).   
7This precept is consistent with our decision in Carlisle Area 
School v. Scott P., 62 F.3d 520, 537 (3d Cir. 1995), where we 
held that an award of compensatory education required a finding 
that an IEP was inappropriate.  
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 The school district, however, may not be able to act 
immediately to correct an inappropriate IEP; it may require some 
time to respond to a complex problem.  Thus, our holding can be 
summarized as follows:  a school district that knows or should 
know that a child has an inappropriate IEP or is not receiving 
more than a de minimis educational benefit must correct the 
situation.  If it fails to do so, a disabled child is entitled to 
compensatory education for a period equal to the period of 
deprivation, but excluding the time reasonably required for the 
school district to rectify the problem.  We believe that this 
formula harmonizes the interests of the child, who is entitled to 
a free appropriate education under IDEA, with those of the school 
district, to whom special education and compensatory education is 
quite costly.     
 Obviously the case against the school district will be 
stronger if the district actually knew of the educational 
deficiency or the parents had complained.  But a child's 
entitlement to special education should not depend upon the 
vigilance of the parents (who may not be sufficiently 
sophisticated to comprehend the problem) nor be abridged because 
the district's behavior did not rise to the level of slothfulness 
or bad faith.  Rather, it is the responsibility of the child's 
teachers, therapists, and administrators - and of the multi-
disciplinary team that annually evaluates the student's progress 
- to ascertain the child's educational needs, respond to 
deficiencies, and place him or her accordingly.    
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 While we have little hard data on compensatory 
education, we do know that administrative law judges in this 
Circuit have awarded it.  Our new standard meshes with the 
approach taken by these judges.  See In Re Jeremy H., No. 593, 
slip op. at 27 (Special Education Appeals Review Panel Pa. May 
21, 1993) (upholding compensatory education in order to rectify 
an inappropriate IEP).  Our holding also accords with the 
conclusions of a recent article reviewing federal court 
strategies for awarding compensatory education.  See Perry A. 
Zirkel, The Remedy of Compensatory Education under the IDEA, 95 
Ed. Law Rep. 483 (1995).  That article maintains that, in 
general, the prerequisite of a compensatory education award has 
not been the gross, egregious, or bad faith conduct of the school 
district but rather a simple finding that a child has received an 
inappropriate education.     
 Since the district court applied an incorrect standard, 
its order denying compensatory education must be reversed.  The 
court found that J.C.'s IEP was inappropriate.  It determined 
that the majority of the skills that J.C. possessed at the time 
of Dr. Henning's evaluation were gained before J.C. was placed at 
OCDTC in 1987, that the same rate of progress did not continue 
after he was placed at OCDTC, and that J.C. plateaued in 1989. 
Thus, J.C.'s educational deprivation appears to have lasted a 
long time.  On remand, the district court should determine when 
the Central Regional knew or should have known that J.C.'s IEP 
was inappropriate or that he was not receiving more than de 
minimis educational benefit; it should also define the reasonable 
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time within which the district should have done something about 
it.  Compensatory education should accrue from that point 
forward. 
 The order of the district court will therefore be 
affirmed in part and reversed in part and the case remanded for 
further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
_____________________ 
